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The Case for Taxing Consumption 
by Murray Weidenbaum 
A low-saving, slow-growing economy such as the United States would benefit greatly 
from shifting the national revenue system from taxing income to taxing consumption. That 
change would provide a powerful incentive to increase the nation's saving and investment and, 
hence, economic growth and living standards. 
Introduction 
Public interest in changing the tax system is growing much faster than public 
understanding of the competing proposals. Democrats and Republicans, liberals and 
conservativ~ all have come up with their favorite nominees for tax cuts - the poor, the 
middle class, manufacturers, savers, investors, producers of luxury goods, and so forth. 
It seems desirable, under these circumstances, to broaden the public debate to go 
beyond the present inconsistent array of specific proposals to modify slightly the income tax, 
which is the heart of the existing federal revenue system. Let us consider the most basic 
change in the government's income structure: abandon the whole idea of taxing income and 
shift to a consumption tax as the primary federal revenue source. 
As we will see, taxing consumption instead of income generates many impacts, mostly 
desirable. A constant theme among tax reformers is the need for increased incentive for 
saving, capital formation, and economic growth. In that light, this report examines the pros 
and cons of consumption taxation and also analyzes the major alternative approaches to 
structuring a new tax of that type. 
The aovemments of most industrialized nations, especially in the European 
Community, use consumption taxes far more than the United States. While 18 percent of 
government revenue comes from taxes on consumption in the United States, the comparable 
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figures are 26 percent for Germany, 29 percent for France and 31 percent for the United 
Kingdom. 
The increasingly international nature of business competition requires updating the 
American tax system to global realities. There are several basic arguments which economists 
have offered over the years for shifting the primary base of taxation from income to 
consumption. It puts the fiscal burden on what people take from society - the goods and 
services they consume- rather than on what they contribute by working and saving. Thus, 
saving is encouraged at the expense of consumption. Unlike current consumption, saving 
makes possible investment in future economic growth. True, problems will arise in setting up 
a new tax, just as difficulties are encountered with the more limited changes that Congress has 
been enacting yearly. 
There are two major types of consumption taxes. One is a value-added tax (VAT), 
such as is customary in Western Europe. The second approach is to change the current income 
tax to an expenditure tax by exempting saving. Unlike selective excise taxes (such as those 
currently levied on cigarettes and alcohol), a value-added tax is comprehensive. It is paid by 
each enterprise in the chain of production- manufacturer, wholesaler, and retailer. 
Duplication is avoided by taxing only the added value that the firm contributes to the goods or 
services it produces. Essentially, value added is the difference between a business's sales and 
its purchases from other companies. 
Let us examine the basic argument for encouraging capital formation by means of tax 
reform. 
Promoting Investment and Economic Growth 
To many citizens, any discussion of capital formation immediately brings to mind 
visions of greedy bankers, wealthy coupon clippers, and - to use what is to many a pejorative 
word - capitalists. Nevertheless, capital plays a pivotal role in providing the basis for the 
future standard of living of any society. Capital is essential for increasing productivity and 
thus providing the basis for rising real incomes. 
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Educators at times find it amusing when some of their students discover communist-
oriented economists writing about the necessity to hold down consumption in the Chinese 
economy in order to free up the capital resources needed to invest in the future growth of that 
economy. "Why, they are not even a capitalist society," these students will note in 
wonderment. 
Then the thought will sink in that a rising stock of capital is necessary for any growing 
society - capitalist (that is, private-enterprise or market-oriented) or other (socialist, 
communist, and so on). It is really a basic matter of how much we want to eat, drink, and be 
merry today, and how much we want to set aside for tomorrow. Boiled down to its 
fundamentals, assuring an adequate flow of saving and investment is little more than 
demonstrating a proper concern for the future. 
A slow pace of capital formation in the United States is especially troublesome at a 
time of heightened global competition, when modem, state-of-the-art machinery and equipment 
are necessary to match foreign firms with low-wage structures. 
Any doubt about the tendency of the U.S. tax system to be biased in favor of 
consumption and against saving can be resolved quickly with a very simple example. Consider 
three factory workers, A, B, and C, each of the same age, with the same work experience and 
size of family, and with the same compensation. Mr. A. regularly spends what he earns, no 
more and no less. Mrs. B, a saver, deposits a portion of her paycheck into a savings account 
each week. Mr. C not only spends everything he earns but also borrows to the hilt, having 
bought as expeusive a house as he could obtain fmancing for. 
It is interesting to compare the differential tax burden of these three workers. Clearly, 
Mrs. B, the saver, will have the highest tax bill, for she pays taxes on her wages as well as on 
the interest that she earns on her savings account. Mr. C winds up with lowest tax bill, as he 
receives a tax deduction for the interest he pays on his large mortgage. Actual practice 
includes many variations in the tax treatment of specific financial transactions. Yet, for the 
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average citizen, the existing personal income tax structure favors consumption over saving. In 
addition, many of the government spending programs - such as welfare and food stamps -
operate with a similar effect. 
Let us assume that A, B, and C all get laid off at the same time and that none of them 
obtains a new job. Mr. C, the big spender, and Mr. A, the pay-as-you-go man, will quickly 
be eligible to receive welfare, food stamps, and related benefits. The last to qualify for federal 
assistance will be Mrs. B, the big saver. Unlike the good Lord, the feds do not seem to help 
those who help themselves. 
Changing the Tax Structure 
All this is no justification for returning to the revenue structure of 1986 and prior 
years, although incentives for saving and investment were greater than they are today. Surely, 
the elimination of many tax shelters was a definite plus for the efficiency of the economy, 
because so many of them had financed investments in uneconomical projects whose major 
purpose was to generate tax benefits. 
Nor is there a need to jump to the conclusion that the investment incentives available 
under the tax structure of the early 1980s provided the most cost-effective way of encouraging 
capital formation. Nevertheless, one important decision for the 1990s is to consider moving to 
a tax system that is more favorable to saving and investment, the keys to economic growth and 
rising living standards. 
A fundamental tax change would be to substitute consumption for income as the basis 
for computing tax liabilities. A consumption-based tax has been described by the American 
Council for Capital Formation as the next frontier in U.S. tax policy. 
Although the subject has only recently gained public attention, for years economists 
have debated the respective merits of income and consumption as the basis for taxation. The 
United States uses consumption taxes to a far lesser degree than most other developed Western 
nations. In 1985, the 23 members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
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Development obtained an average 30 percent of their revenue from taxes on consumption (see 
Table 1). For the United States, the ratio was 18 percent. Since the table was prepared, Japan 
has increased its dependence on consumption taxation. 
Many analysts believe that it is fairer to tax people on what they take from society, 
rather than on what they contribute by working and investing. In the nineteenth century, 
classical economist John Stuart Mill made this point in advocating the exemption of saving as 
part of a "just" income tax system. In the 1940s, American economist Irving Fisher argued 
that the income tax involved double taxation of saving and distorted the choice of individuals in 
favor of consumption. Thus, not only is the income tax unjust, but it encourages consumption 
and leisure at the expense of thrift and enterprise. 
The U.S. Treasury actually proposed a "spending tax" in 1942 as a temporary wartime 
measure to curb inflation. The proposal was quickly rejected by Congress. A major argument 
against such a tax - then and now - is that the exemption of saving would favor the rich, 
since they are better able to save large portions of their incomes. Some believe that this would 
lead to greater concentrations of wealth in the hands of a few. Proponents of a consumption 
tax respond that it can be made as steeply progressive as desired. Moreover, the recent trend 
in income taxation in the United States has been away from progressive and toward a flatter, 
more proportional revenue structure. The 1981 and 1986 tax statutes are striking cases in 
point. 
Another objection to the consumption base is that it would favor the miser over the 
spendthrift, even when both have similar spending power or ability to pay. The response 
offered to thia argument is that consumption uses up the resources available to the nation, 
while saving adds to these resources. Thus, people should be taxed on what they take out of 
the society's pool of resources, not on what they put into it. 
Tax experts have devised, and criticized, a variety of specific consumption-
based taxes. No consensus has yet been reached on the details. It is likely that three 
interrelated clusters of issues will receive increased public attention in the 1990s: (1) the 
Country 
Austria 
Australia 
Belgium 
Canada 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Japan 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Norway 
Portugal 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Turkey 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Average 
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Table 1 
Percentage Distribution of Tax Revenues in Selected 
Countries by Major Source, Fiscal Year 1985 
Social 
Income Security Taxes on All 
Taxes Taxes Consumption Other 
54% 0% 33% 13% 
26 32 33 9 
41 33 24 2 
44 13 32 11 
55 4 34 7 
50 9 37 4 
17 44 29 10 
35 36 26 3 
17 35 43 5 
34 15 45 6 
36 35 25 4 
46 30 14 10 
45 25 24 6 
26 44 26 4 
69 0 23 8 
40 21 37 2 
29 26 43 2 
28 42 26 4 
42 25 26 7 
41 32 19 8 
45 5 44 6 
39 18 31 12 
43 29 18 10 
40 26 30 4 
Source: American Council for Capital Formation 
Total 
100% 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
desirability of a tax on consumption, (2) the specific form that it should take ("top down" or 
"bottom up"), and (3) whether it should replace or augment an existing tax. 
A Consumption Tax 
In practice, much of the impact of shifting to a consumption tax base would depend on 
how the tax was structured. The two major alternatives are consumption taxes levied on total 
purchases (top down) and value-added taxes collected on individual sales (bottom up). In 
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theory, the base of the two taxes is the same - the value of goods and services purchased -
and the yields could be very similar. 
Consumption taxes would be collected much as income taxes are, levied directly on the 
taxpayer. The annual taxpayer return would continue to comprise the heart of the collection 
system, containing exemptions and deductions, as at present. However, one major change 
would be instituted: the portion of income that is saved would be exempt from taxation. 
Figure 1 is a hypothetical example of a "short form" version of a consumption tax 
return. It shows how the difficult bookkeeping requirement to tally all consumption outlays 
could be structured. The illustrative tax form is based on the notion that income equals 
consumption plus saving. Thus, consumption can be readily estimated, indirectly but 
accurately, merely by deducting saving from income (and taxpayers are used to developing 
estimates of their incomes). That new schedule would include changes in bank balances and in 
holdings of bonds, stocks and similar investment assets. 
A tax on consumption could be made as progressive as any income tax by adjusting the 
rates. Like the income tax, it could be used as part of fiscal policy to fight inflation or 
recession. In the longer run, it might generate more revenue - or permit rate reductions - to 
the extent that the added savings stimulate economic growth. 
For a while, the United States was moving toward a consumption tax, albeit indirectly 
and in modest steps. The establishment of independent retirement accounts (IRAs) enabled 
many federal taxpayers to defer paying taxes on amounts saved and invested in an IRA (up to 
$2,000 a year). Also, the first $100 of dividends per taxpayer was exempt from income 
taxation. The 1986 tax law, however, sharply cut back on IRAs and eliminated the dividend 
credit. 
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stage sales tax levied at the retail level. It is, in effect, a sophisticated and comprehensive sales 
tax which avoids the double counting otherwise inevitable when the same item moves from 
manufacturer to wholesaler to retailer. 
Essentially, a firm's value added is the difference between its sales and its purchases 
from other firms. As show in Table 2, value added can also be estimated by adding labor and 
capital inputs supplied by the firm itself- represented by wages and salaries, rent and interest 
payments, and profit. 
Reasons for Favoring a VAT 
Proponents of the VAT contend that it is economically neutral, because ideally it 
would be levied at a uniform rate on all items of consumption. It does not distort choices 
among products or methods of production. Thus, shifting to a more capital-intensive and 
perhaps more profitable method of production does not influence the tax burden. Many of 
these arguments apply with equal force to any comprehensive tax on consumption. Nor is the 
allocation of resources across product, market, and industry lines affected by a tax on value-
added. In these regards, the VAT is far superior to the existing array of selective excise taxes. 
Advocates of the value-added tax also point out that, in contrast to an income tax, there 
is no penalty for efficiency and no subsidy for waste. Moreover, the VAT is neutral between 
incorporated and unincorporated businesses and, theoretically, even between public and private 
enterprises. By focusing on consumption, it avoids a double tax burden on the returns from 
capital. This tax starts off with no exclusions or exemptions and thus, at least initially, 
provides a broader and fairer tax base, one that the underground economy will have more 
difficulty evading. Consumption taxes such as the VAT are levied on the returns to labor 
(wages and salaries) equally with the returns on capital (rent, interest, and profits). 
Another argument in favor of U.S. adoption of a value-added tax is that so many other 
nations have adopted this form of revenue. It fits in better than other taxes with the growing 
international character of production. The VAT has become one of the revenue workhorses of 
( 
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Table 2 
Two Methods or Computing Value Added 
Raw 
Materials Manu- Whole- Cumu-
Item Producer facturer saler Retailer lative 
Purchases of inputs $100 $500 $800 $1,400 
Value Added: 
Wages $60 $275 $200 $100 $635 
Rent 10 25 40 50 125 
Interest 10 50 25 25 110 
Profit 
--12 22 .....ll ~ _uQ 
Total Value Added $100 $400 $300 $200 $1,000 
Sales of output $100 $500 $800 $1,000 $2,400 
Note: Value added can be estimated in two ways: 
(1) Deducting purchases from sales of output 
(2) Adding inputs by the firm itself (excluding inputs supplied by others); 
thus $2,400- $1,400 = $635 + $125 + $110 + $130 = $1,000 
the world. Virtually every important country in Europe imposes the tax and it has spread 
throughout the Third World (see Table 3). The members of the European Common Market 
have used VAT taxation since the late 1960s or early 1970s. In 1989, Japan imposed a 
broadbased 3 percent sales tax. 
Unlike the situation in the United States, the adoption of a tax on value added was true 
reform in Western Europe. Value-added taxes typically replaced an extremely inefficient form 
of consumption tax that was already in place, a cascading sales or turnover revenue system. 
Those latter taxes apply to the total amount of a firm's sales rather than only to its value 
added. Sales taxes, thus, would be paid over and over again on the same items as they moved 
from firm to firm in various stages of the production and distribution process. Such cascade-
type taxes favored integrated firms (who could legally avoid one or more stages of the tax), but 
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Table 3 
Representative VAT Rates, February 1992 
Nation 
Argentina 
Austria 
Belgium 
Benin 
Bolivia 
Brazil 
Canada 
Chile 
Columbia 
Costa Rica 
Denmark 
Dominican Republic 
Ecuador· 
Estonia 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Guatemala 
Haiti 
Honduras 
Hungary 
Iceland 
Indonesia 
Ireland 
Israel 
Italy 
Ivory Coast 
Japan 
Kenya 
Latvia 
Luxembourg 
Madagas.c~aJt;,,,, ·''''·· ""'···· 
Malawi 
..:; . ··~ 
. ,.,. :~: ..... ·, 
Maltt;:> ~::~~::::Iilll~~;j~~~tl~llt:i;1~(\i~i!~~j;:~:::;;:)~~{F~~~tl~~~l>:== 
Mexico 
Mo~~~11fif:IillNM*titf@f=;?JK=j:):!EtfE,,,. 
Netherlands 
New:':Zw~iB:Kmi::::r:;wt.:~::~mmt:::•:. ·· 
Nicaragua 
Niger:/ 
Norway 
Pakistan 
Panama 
}'araguay ,. 
Peru 
Philippines 
Portugal 
·:·: 
Year VAT Introduced 
1975 
1973 
1971 
1991 
1973 
1967 
1991 
1975 
1975 
1975 
1967 
1983 
1970 
1992 
1990 
1968 
1968 
1987 
1983 
1982 
1976 
1988 
1990 
1985 
1972 
1976 
1973 
1960 
1989 
1990 
1992 
1970 
1969 
1989 
1991 
1980 
1986 
1969 
1986· 
1975 
1986 
1970 
1990 
1977 
1991 
1976 
1988 
1986 
·· .. ·· 
. ·: ...... . 
Current Standard Rate 
16% 
20 
19 
18 
11 
11 
7 
18 
10 
8 
22 
6 
6 
10 
11 
18.6 
14 
18 
7 
10 
7 
25 
24.5 
10 
2l 
16 
19 
25 
3 
17 
12 
12 
15 
35 
17 
15 
19 
18.5 
12.5 
.. to · 
:·: 25· 
. 20 . 
12~5 
5 
12.,,.,. 
18 
10 
17 
Natiop 
Russia 
South Korea 
Spain 
Sweden 
Taiwan 
Trinidad 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
Ukraine. 
United Kingdom 
Uruguay· 
12 
Year VAT Introduced 
1992 
1977 
1986 
1969 
1986 
1990 
1988 
1985 
1992 
1973 
1968 
Source: International Monetary Fund 
Current Standard Rate 
28 
10 
12" 
25 
5 
15 
17 
12 
28 
17.5 
22 
they severely discriminated against independent companies who operate at only one phase of 
the production process. 
An added, widely cited reason for adopting a VAT is the anticipated foreign trade 
benefits. Unlike an income tax, a sales-based tax can be imposed on goods entering the 
country and rebated on items leaving - supposedly encouraging exports and discouraging 
imports. Thus, at first blush, a VAT would seem to help reduce this nation's presently large 
deficit. However, most economists believe that fluctuations in exchange rates would largely 
offset these initial effects and result in little change in the balance of trade. 
Reasons for Opposing a VAT 
Opponents of a value-added tax offer an extensive list of shortcomings. They contend 
that a VAT, as in the case of any consumption-based revenue source, is inherently regressive 
-those least able to pay face the highest rates. That regressivity can be softened by 
exempting food and medicine or by refunds to low-income taxpayers, but such variations make 
the collection of the tax more complicated. They also provide opportunity for people in the 
underground economy to avoid paying taxes. 
Because the VAT is included in the price of purchases, it registers in all of the price 
indices and, hence, exerts an inflationary force on the economy. The counterargument is that 
this is only a one-time effect, occurring when the tax is enacted or increased. However, there 
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would be secondary effects resulting from the operation of automatic escalators in wage and 
price agreements. That inflationary impact could be offset by appropriate changes in monetary 
policy, albeit at times with an adverse effect on the levels of production and employment. 
Opponents also charge that a VAT would invade the area of sales taxation, traditionally 
reserved for state and local governments. However, states, and some localities, have come to 
rely on income taxes despite heavy use of the same tax base by the federal government. 
Turning to the administrative aspects, imposition of a value-added tax in the United 
States would require establishing a new tax-collection system by the federal government and 
new recordkeeping on the part of taxpayers. The Treasury Department, based on European 
experience, believes it would need 18 months after enactment to begin administering a VAT. 
A variety of approaches has been suggested for collecting the new tax. The simplest is 
the credit method (see Table 4). Under this approach, the tax is computed initially on a 
company's total sales and the firm is given credit for the VAT paid by its suppliers. To a 
substantial degree, such a VAT would be self-enforced. Each company would have a powerful 
incentive to ensure that its suppliers paid their full share of the tax, because any underpayment 
would have to be made up by the next firm in the chain of production and distribution. 
In practice, the collection of the VAT may not be as simple as shown here. That 
would be the case if certain transactions were exempted (such as food) and if nonprofit 
institutions and government enterprises were treated differently from business firms. 
Exemptions are no minor matter in terms of the administrative complexity that they generate. 
In France, a long and extensive debate occurred over whether or not Head and Shoulders anti-
dandruff shampoo was a tax-exempt medicine or a cosmetic subject to the full VAT. 
There is a great variation in the VAT rates within the various countries that use it. In 
Western Europe, the standard VAT rate ranges from 12 percent in Spain to 25 in Ireland, 
although some luxury items are taxed at higher rates. However, Spain taxes some items at as 
low as 6 percent and Ireland's VAT on occasion is down to 2.4 percent. The United Kingdom 
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Table 4 
Computing the VAT Using the Credit Method 
Raw Materials Manu- Whole-
Item Producer facturer saler Retailer 
Sales of output $100 $500 $800 $1,000 
Less purchases _Q ...lQ2 _jQQ .100 
Value added $100 $400 $300 $200 
Tax on total sales $10 $50 $80 $100 
Credit on purchases .J.Q ~ _jQ 
Tax liability $10 $40 $30 $20 
Note: Assumes 10 percent VAT on a consumption basis. 
has a zero tax on books and food. The future minimum VAT rate in the European Community 
has been set at 15 percent. 
Macroeconomic Effects 
On the basis of 1990 levels of economic activity, a 5 percent VAT would yield in the 
neighborhood of $100 billion in federal revenue (depending on the coverage of the tax). If the 
VAT is considered to be an additional source of federal revenues, fiscal flows of such 
magnitude likely would generate a variety of other impacts on the economy. For example, 
these estimates of the yield of the VAT assume that the Federal Reserve will follow an 
accommodating monetary policy, with a somewhat inflationary effect. 
Because the withdrawal of such substantial amounts of purchasing power would act as 
a depressant on the economy, a tax of that magnitude might be phased in over a period of time 
-or offset by reductioDI in existing income taxes. One econometric analysis ~ncludes that 
the economy would grow about 1 percent more slowly for each 1 percent of VAT levied and 
that inflation would be 1-112 to 2 percent higher during an initial adjustment period. 
1S 
In policy terms, the institution of a new tax in the 1990s should not be viewed in 
isolation but in comparison to likely alternatives: 
• Foregoing desirable increases in government programs 
• Increasing income tax rates 
• Continuing with high levels of deficit financing 
Each of these other approaches to the budget problem would be accompanied by 
substantial burdens or costs, although they would differ from those generated by the imposition 
of a consumption-based tax such as a VAT. Foregoing increases in education, infrastructure, 
and research and development might have adverse consequences on the prospects for economic 
growth. Reversal of the 1980s trend toward lower marginal income tax rates would reduce the 
incentives to work, save, and invest. Continued high levels of deficit spending would bring 
their own set of drawbacks, ranging from high real interest rates to upward pressure on the 
dollar and thus on the foreign trade deficit. 
Value-Added Tax as a Substitute 
The substitution of a value-added tax for all or portions of existing income and payroll 
taxes is also a possibility. In the recent past, several proposals have been made to make the 
VAT a part of the U.S. tax structure. 
In 1980, Representative AI Ullman (D-Ore.), then Chairman of the House Ways and 
Means Committee, introduced a comprehensive revenue bill. It provided for individual and 
corporate income tax rate reductions, liberalized depreciation rules, expanded retirement 
savings provisions and reduced Social Security taxes, all of which were offset by a 10 percent 
tax applied to a moderately narrow value-added base (which excluded food, housing, medical 
care, farmers, fishermen, mass transit, interest, and exports). Ullman's defeat for reelection 
soon after dampened the enthusiasm for a VAT for some time. 
In 198S, Senator William Roth (R-Del.) proposed a variation of the VAT called a 
Business Transfer Tax (B'IT). It would be a way in which companies could pay for their 
( 
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Social Security tax liabilities. The base for the new tax would be similar to the earlier Ullman 
proposal. His bill also called for using the net revenues of his consumption-style tax (after the 
Social Security credit) to reduce individual tax rates and to provide increased individual saving 
incentives. In 1986, Senator Roth outlined explicit income tax rate reductions and investment-
related provisions which would be funded by revenues from an eight percent BTI (after the 
Social Security credit) applied to a much broader base than his earlier proposal. 
In 1992, former California Governor Jerry Brown proposed a 13 percent value-added 
tax to accompany the move to a flat income tax at the same rate. 
Conclusions 
On balance, it seems that a "top down" consumption tax would achieve most of the 
benefits intended for a VAT with few of the shortcomings of that "bottom up" type of revenue 
measure. Converting the income tax to a consumption tax - unlike adopting a new tax on 
value added - does not require setting up an additional collection system. Nor is it regressive 
or inflationary. Unlike a VAT, transforming the existing income tax does not provide the 
federal government with a new revenue source; therefore, the public sector is not likely to 
grow as rapidly. 
In contrast, a value-added tax becomes complicated if an effort is made to soften its 
regressivity by exempting certain categories of expenditures or taxing them at lower rates 
(e.g., food, medicine, education). 
It is not surprising that politicians in many countries favor sales-type taxation on the 
assumption that the best tax is a hidden tax. The fact is that "bottom up" sales taxes such as a 
VAT are rarely identified separately, and the purchaser merely pays a combined product-and-
tax price. That type of consumption tax thus finds business firms acting as the middleman (or 
woman) between government and the consumer. Many companies marketing consumer 
products fear that the higher prices resulting from imposing a VAT will reduce their sales and 
profits. Conversely, companies selling capital equipment and business services tend to take a 
• 
17 
more sympathetic attitude toward this form of government revenue, which would lighten the 
tax burden on their customers and, hence, tend to expand their markets. 
Changing the income tax to a comprehensive consumption tax, in contrast, would not 
be shielded from the knowledge of the taxpayer and is not likely to generate such differential 
reactions. In any event, the shift in emphasis in U.S. taxation from income to consumption 
should on balance generate positive results, especially in helping to move the economy to a 
more rapid expansion path and, thus, enable the American people to enjoy a higher living 
standard. 
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